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We must work together to safeguard our future-the future of
mankind. To find the way for a common work for a common goal
there is no need for a revolution. There is need merely of deep
knowledge, of objective thought, of constructive discussion, and of
willingness for understanding.
Hugo Boyko1
Global climate change is the most significant environmental is-
sue facing our nation and the world. There no longer is any ques-
tion that global warming is occurring. Nor is there any serious de-
bate about whether human activity is the root cause. If we fail to
make significant reductions in greenhouse gas emissions over the
next ten to twenty years, we face the possibility of catastrophic en-
vironmental harm by the end of this century.
1. Hugo Boyko, Introduction to SCIENCE AND THE FUTURE OF MANKIND 7 (Hugo
Boyko ed., 1961). Hugo Boyko was a pioneer in global ecology and the founder and first
Secretary-General of the World Academy of Art and Science. The first author (his grand-
son) would like to dedicate his contribution to this article to his memory.
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The leading proposal in the United States and abroad for ad-
dressing global climate change is some form of market-based cap
and trade system. During the 2008 presidential campaign, both
major party candidates supported cap and trade. Many of the
mainstream environmental groups advocate cap and trade and, in
an unusual alliance, their position is shared by many industry
groups. A cap and trade system therefore is likely to be the focal
point of domestic legislation during the Obama Administration
and whatever international agreement follows the Kyoto Protocol,
which expires in 2012.
The popularity of a cap and trade system may reflect the fact
that cap and trade offers something for everyone. For environmen-
talists, cap and trade promises a declining cap on the carbon diox-
ide emissions that are the principal cause of global warming. For
industry groups, cap and trade offers the possibility of a new mar-
ket in carbon allowances and therefore the potential for significant
income for companies who can inexpensively reduce their carbon
dioxide emissions. For economists, cap and trade allows the mar-
ket to take into account externalities as it determines the price of
carbon. For politicians, cap and trade offers the opportunity to
take action to combat global warming without implementation of a
complex regulatory permitting scheme or imposition of a tax on
fossil fuels.
The global climate change crisis calls for innovation from in-
dustry to meet the challenge of carbon dioxide emissions reduc-
tions and promote the development of alternative energy sources.
It is essential that the United States and the world take strong and
decisive action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. A cap and
trade system offers the benefit of increasing limits on carbon diox-
ide emissions and, at least theoretically, a flexible approach that
allows the market to select the most efficient and innovative car-
2. Andrew C. Revkin, On Global Warming, McCain and Obama Agree: Urgent Action Is
Needed, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2008, at A2. While both candidates supported adoption of a
cap and trade system, they disagreed about when credits should be auctioned and the lev-
els at which reductions should occur, just two of the issues that could make a cap and trade
system difficult to implement, administer, and enforce.
2009]
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bon dioxide reduction techniques and thus lower the cost of any
required carbon dioxide emission reductions.3
The popular and intellectual appeal of a cap and trade system,
however, obscures a number of practical considerations that, at a
minimum, counsel against cap and trade as the leading edge of
domestic efforts to combat climate change. First, even if Congress
passed cap and trade legislation early in the Obama Administra-
tion, it would be years before a cap and trade system would be-
come operational, because of the inherent delays of the rulemak-
ing process (including the likelihood of litigation over whatever
regulatory system is adopted). Second, the effectiveness of a cap
and trade system could be undermined by the challenges of setting
baselines for emission reduction targets, the free distribution of al-
lowances, and the use of offsets in lieu of meaningful emission re-
duction measures. Third, while a cap and trade system promises
fixed reductions in carbon dioxide emissions, the tradeoff is un-
certainty about the price of those reductions. If the price of carbon
rises too high, there will be political pressure to relax the carbon
cap, thus removing the primary benefit of a cap and trade system.
Moreover, an international environmental crisis is not the best
time to experiment with a largely untested emissions control sys-
tem on a global scale. It is far from clear that a cap and trade sys-
tem for carbon dioxide emissions will work on a national and in-
ternational level. While the United States utilized a cap and trade
system to reduce acid rain in the 1990s,4 we have never used cap
and trade to address an emissions problem that involves such a
wide variety of sources, nor do we have experience with a global
cap and trade system.
A more efficient and effective market-based approach to re-
duce carbon dioxide emissions would be a carbon tax imposed on
3. See RICHARD B. STEWART AND JONATHAN B. WIENER, RECONSTRUCTING CLIMATE
POLICY 67-68 (2003) (arguing that cap and trade programs, as well as emission taxes, pro-
vide continuing financial incentives to adopt new, less costly abatement methods). For a
contrary view, see David M. Driesen, Does Emissions Trading Encourage Innovation?, [2003]
33 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10094 (claiming that emissions trading provides less
stimulation for innovation than traditional regulation).
4. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, Title IV, § 401, 104 Stat.
2584 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651o). The United States also used as-
pects of a cap and trade system during the phase-out of leaded gasoline in the 1970s.
[Vol. 28:3
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all coal, natural gis, and oil produced domestically or imported
into the United States. A carbon tax would enable the market to
account for the societal costs of carbon dioxide emissions and
thereby promote emission reductions, just like a cap and trade sys-
tem. A carbon tax would be easier to implement and enforce,
however, and simpler to adjust if the resulting market-based
changes were either too weak or too strong. A carbon tax also
would produce revenue that could be used to fund research and
development of alternative energy and tax credits to offset any re-
gressive effects of the carbon tax. Because a carbon tax could be
implemented and become effective almost immediately, it would
be a much quicker method of reducing greenhouse gas emissions
than a cap and trade system. In addition, because a carbon tax
could be effective in advance of any international treaty regarding
greenhouse gas emissions, a carbon tax would provide the United
States much needed credibility in the negotiations over interna-
tional carbon dioxide limits. A carbon tax could then supplement
an international cap and trade system, combine with emission caps
in an international hybrid "cap and tax" approach, or become the
focal point for the next international treaty to address global cli-
mate change.
A carbon tax carries its own practical limitations, perhaps the
most significant of which is the challenge of enacting tax legisla-
tion in the United States. Those political considerations may be
compounded by instability in energy prices (which peaked at over
$140 per barrel during the summer of 2008, only to fall below $50
per barrel by November 2008) and economic concerns created by
the global credit crisis during the fall of 2008. A cap and trade sys-
tem may be more viable politically, because it is not labeled a tax
nor is it as transparent about its effect on energy prices. The politi-
cal advantages of cap and trade may be more illusory than real,
however, since opponents of climate change legislation will argue
that either approach would increase energy costs and further dam-
age an already weakened economy.' Moreover, while climate
5. Stephen Power & Leila Abboud, Climate Effort Could Be Stalled by Credit Crisis, WALL
ST.J., Oct. 16, 2008, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB22411508399938601
.html#articleTabs %3Darticle.
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change legislation will be difficult to enact during a possible reces-
sion, the climate change crisis will worsen and become more costly
to address if Congress fails to enact limits on greenhouse gas emis-
sions early in the Obama Administration.'
Part I of this Article reviews the global climate change crisis
and the inadequacy of historical efforts to combat global warming.
This overview demonstrates the need for strong and immediate ac-
tion to address climate change after such a long history of relative
inaction, particularly in the United States. Part II discusses alterna-
tives for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, specifically carbon
dioxide. We focus on traditional regulatory approaches under ex-
isting provisions of the Clean Air Act, since those would be easier
to implement than a new statutory scheme. We conclude that an
"upstream" market-based approach that targets fossil fuel produc-
tion, perhaps in combination with selected regulatory controls un-
der the Clean Air Act, would make the most sense for reducing
carbon dioxide emissions across all sectors of the economy.
Part III explains why a carbon tax would be a more effective
market-based response to global climate change than a cap and
trade system. This Part argues that both a carbon tax and a cap and
trade system incorporate the necessary carbon price signal, with a
tax offering "price certainty" and cap and trade offering "benefit
certainty," but asserts that a carbon tax would be simpler to im-
plement, more transparent, and less vulnerable to abuse. A carbon
tax would also generate needed revenue to support development
of alternatives to fossil fuels, and it would send a stronger message
about the perils of carbon dioxide emissions. Part IV concludes by
suggesting that, while fundamental changes also must occur in en-
ergy, transportation, and land use policy, an effective mitigation
strategy for carbon dioxide emissions will be the centerpiece of any
successful program to combat global climate change.
6. We are not suggesting that climate change mitigation must be justified through
cost-benefit analysis, which provides a poor analytical fit because of uncertainty about the
long-term societal and ecological costs associated with climate change. See generally Douglas
A. Kysar, Climate Change, Cultural Transformation, and Comprehensive Rationality, 31 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 555 (2004). To the extent that opposition to climate change mitiga-
tion efforts focuses on economic costs, however, it merits emphasis that the costs of a car-
bon tax (or a cap and trade system) will be dwarfed by the costs of failing to take effective
measures to combat climate change, and those costs will escalate over time.
[Vol. 28:3
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I. THE GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE CRISIS AND THE INADEQUACY OF
HISTORICAL EFFORTS TO COMBAT GLOBAL WARMING
For more than forty years, scientists have expressed concern
about growing carbon concentrations in the atmosphere and re-
sulting global climate change. Public concern has lagged behind
the scientific evidence, and our political leaders have been even
slower to recognize the magnitude of the climate change crisis. In
the past several years, however, with the release of An Inconvenient
Truth and mounting evidence of global warming, the political de-
bate about the existence of global climate change has largely
ended-only to be replaced by the more difficult question of what
to do about climate change.8
This Part of the Article begins-with an overview of the evidence
that climate change is occurring and the steps that must be taken
to avoid its most catastrophic effects. It then reviews historical ef-
forts to address climate change and the inadequacy of those meas-
ures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and thereby avert a
global climate change crisis.
A. Overview of the Global Climate Change Crisis
The scientific evidence that global warming is occurring is
overwhelming. In 1988, the United Nations Environmental Pro-
gramme and the World Meteorological Organization formed the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (the IPCC) to pro-
vide objective scientific analysis on all aspects of climate change.
The most recent IPCC report, released in November 2007, con-
cluded that "[e]leven of the last twelve years (1995-2006) rank
among the twelve warmest years in the instrumental record of
global surface temperatures (since 1850)."' The IPCC reported
7. AN INCONVENIENT TRUTH (Paramount Classics 2006).
8. E.g., EDWARD A. PARSON ET AL., GLOBAL-CHANGE SCENARIOS: REPORT BY TFiE U.S.
CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE PROGRAM' AND THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON GLOBAL CHANGE
RESEARCH 10 (2007), available at http://www.climatescience.gov/Library/sap/sap2-1/
finalreport/sap2-1 b-final-all.pdf.
9. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:
SYNTHESIS REPORT, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 1 (2007) [hereinafter IPCC REPORT].
The November 2007 IPCC report reflected the efforts of more than 500 lead authors and
2,000 expert reviewers. The report was released too early to account for 2007 tempera-
tures, but a recent study found that 2007 was tied with 1998 as the second hottest year on
2009]
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that temperature increases have occurred throughout the world,
but most significantly at higher northern latitudes."
The melting of Arctic ice has often been called "the canary in
the coal mine" of global warming.1" In 2007, Arctic ice melted at
record levels, causing the opening of the fabled Northwest Passage
to navigation for the first time. 12 During the same summer, a re-
cord 552 billion tons of ice melted from the Greenland ice sheet. 3
It is hard to overstate the significance of melting in Greenland. If
global warming continues unabated, climatologists predict that the
entire Greenland ice sheet will melt, causing several meters of sea
level rise and coastal flooding that could imperil much of the east-
ern United States.
14
While some skeptics argue that global warming is part of nor-
mal climate change, 5 few climatologists agree. The earth haLs ex-
perienced periods of cooling and warming over time, but warming
has never occurred at the rate that it is happening today. The most
recent IPCC report noted that "[m] ost of the observed increase in
global average temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely
due to the observed increase in anthropogenic [greenhouse gas]
concentrations.
'16
Anthropogenic greenhouse gases include carbon dioxide,
methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons,
record; the hottest year was 2005. GODDARD INST. FOR SPACE STUDIES, NAT'L AERO. &
SPACE ADMIN., GLOBAL TEMPERATURE TRENDS: 2007 SUMMATION, http://data.giss.nasa.gov
/gistemp/2007/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2008).
10. Id. at 2.
11. NASA climate scientist H. Jay Zwally, commenting on the melting of the Arctic
Ocean, stated in December 2007 that "[t]he Arctic is often cited as the canary in the coal
mine for climate warming. Now... the canary has died. It is time to start getting out of the
coal mines." Seth Borenstein, Rate of Ice Melting Shocks Warming Experts, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Dec. 11, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22203980.
12. Laurie Goering, Ice-Free Arctic in Summer Seen in 7 Years, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 14, 2007,
at 12.
13. Borenstein, supra note 11 (citing preliminary satellite data to be released by
NASA).
14. IPCC REPORT, supra note 9, at 13.
15. See, e.g., S. FRED SINGER & DENNIS T. AVERY, UNSTOPPABLE GLOBAL WARMING
EVERY 1,500 YEARS (2007).
16. IPCC REPORT, supra note 9, at 5. As used by the IPCC, the term "very likely" cor-
responds to a greater than ninety percent probability of occurrence. INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT 27 (2007) [here-
inafter IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT].
[Vol. 28:3
HeinOnline  -- 28 Stan. Envtl. L. J. 10 2009
COMBATING GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE
and sulfur hexafluoride. Carbon dioxide is by far the most signifi-
cant of the greenhouse gases, accounting for approximately sev-
enty-five percent of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions be-
tween 1970 and 2004.17 Annual global emissions of carbon dioxide
increased "almost fivefold in the past century," and these emissions
"have tripled since 1950."'" The most significant contributing fac-
tor in the carbon dioxide emissions increase is the burning of fossil
fuels for electricity, heating, air conditioning, and transportation;
land-use changes, particularly deforestation, also have played a
significant but smaller role. 9
Historically, the United States is the largest contributor to
global warming, responsible for approximately twenty-five percent
21of global carbon dioxide emissions. China now emits as much
greenhouse gas as the United States,2 ' and India is not far behind,2
but the United States remains well ahead of these countries in per
capita greenhouse gas emissions.21 Moreover, in terms of cumula-
tive greenhouse gas emissions, the United States is by far the world
leader; 24 no other nation comes close.
17. See IPCC REPORT, supra note 9, at 5 fig.SPM.3. This percentage includes carbon
dioxide released as a result of deforestation.
18. JAMES GUSTAVE SPETH, RED SKY AT MORNING: AMERICA AND THE CRISIS OF THE
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 45 (2004).
19. E.g., IPCC REPORT, supra note 9, at 5 fig.SPM.3.
20. E.g., NAT'L ACAD. OF SCI. ET AL., Understanding and Responding to Climate Change
18 fig.12 (2005), available at http://dels.nas.edu/dels/rptbriefs/climate-change-final.pdf.
21. Eg., NETH. ENVTL. ASSESSMENT AGENCY, CHINA Now NO. 1 IN C02 EMISSIONS;
USA IN SECOND POSITION (2008), http://www.mnp.nl/en/dossiers/Climatechange/more
info/ChinanownolinCO2emissionsUSAinsecondposition.html (2008).
22. See generally P.R. SHUKLA ET AL., CLIMATE POLICY ASSESSMENT FOR INDIA 142
(2004) (predicting major increases in the amount of energy needed to fuel India by 2030
and predicting that coal will likely fill much of this need).
23. For instance, in 1991, the per capita greenhouse gas emissions in the United
States were approximately thirty times larger than the per capita emissions in India. Jyoti
Parikh, India's Efforts to Minimize Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Policies, Measures, and Institutions,
in INDIA AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 333, 334 (Michael A. Toman, Ujjayant Chakra-
vorty, & Shreekant Gupta eds., 2003).
24. E.g., DONALD A. BROWN, AMERICAN HEAT: ETHICAL PROBLEMS WITH THE UNITED
STATES' RESPONSE TO GLOBAL WARMING 156 (2002). The United States is responsible for
thirty percent of cumulative greenhouse gas emissions; the United States emits the same
amount of greenhouse gases as 2.6 billion people living in 151 developing countries.
SPETH, supra note 18, at 61.
2009]
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Compounding the climate change problem is the fact that
greenhouse gas emissions continue to grow at an alarming rate. If
greenhouse gas emissions were to remain at current levels, many
parts of the world still might be uninhabitable by the end of the
century.25 Yet the global rate of greenhouse gas emissions is not
stabilizing; it is accelerating. The rate of global greenhouse gas
emissions due to human activity grew by seventy percent between
1970 and 2004.26 With the rapid industrialization of China and In-
dia, and absent efforts to control greenhouse gas emissions there
and in the rest of the world, carbon dioxide emissions are pro-
jected to grow by fifty-five percent globally between 2004 and
2030.27
One of the cruel ironies of the climate change crisis is that de-
veloped countries like the United States have contributed the most
to global warming,28 yet less developed countries will suffer the
worst ill effects. 29 Part of the challenge facing less developed coun-
tries is that many of them are located in regions of the world where
natural resources, most notably water and food supplies, are scarce
even without the detrimental effects of global climate change." In
addition, both because of those natural resource limitations and
economic constraints, less developed countries will be less able to
adapt to climate change when it occurs.1
Significant reductions in greenhouse gas emissions must occur
during the next ten to twenty years to avoid the worst conse-
quences of global warming. Climatologists warn that we must limit
25. JAMES GUSTAVE SPETH, THE BRIDGE AT THE EDGE OF THE WORLD: CAPITALISM,
THE ENVIRONMENT, AND CROSSING FROM CRISIS TO SUSTAINABILiTY, at x (2008).
26. IPCC REPORT, supra note 9, at 5. The rate of greenhouse gas emissions in the
United States increased by over sixteen percent between 1990 and 2005. John Donnelly,
EPA Reports a Rise in Greenhouse Gases, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 21, 2007, at 9A; U.S. DEP'T OF
ENERGY, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., EMISSIONS OF GREENHOUSE GASES, 1980-2006,
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/txt/ptbl201.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2008).
27. SPETH, supra note 25, at 27 (citing INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD
ENERGY OUTLOOK, 2006 (2006)). The IPCC projects an increase of twenty-five to ninety
percent between 2000 and 2030. IPCC REPORT, supra note 9, at 7.
28. BROWN, supra note 24, at 156 ("[T]he developed nations have contributed 84
percent of the greenhouse gas emissions from 1800 to the present.").
29. E.g., id. at 92-94.
30. See id. at 93.
31. Id. at 93-94.
[Vol. 28:3
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global warming to approximately 2C or 4F to avoid catastrophic
environmental effects.3 2 To put these numbers in perspective, av-
erage temperatures have only varied by 1.8'F during the last
10,000 years. Since the end of the last ice age, average tempera-
tures have only increased by 5 to 9°F.ss
To limit global warming to 2°C or 4°F will require stabilizing
carbon dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere at around 450
parts per million (ppm), and some recent analyses recommend
stabilizing at 400 ppm or even lower to prevent going above this
temperature threshold.'4 To put those targets in context, preindus-
trial carbon concentrations in the atmosphere were 280 ppm; to-
day, carbon concentrations in the atmosphere are approximately
380 ppm, which is higher than the natural range over the last
650,000 years.35 At current rates carbon concentrations will in-
crease by 2 ppm each year, which means that, without reductions
in carbon dioxide emissions, carbon concentrations will reach 450
ppm before the middle of this century. Unfortunately, unless we
take steps to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, we are likely to
reach 450 ppm even sooner, because, as noted above, the rate of
carbon dioxide emissions is increasing so rapidly.36
Perhaps the most sobering aspect of the climate change prob-
lem is the long lag time for reducing carbon dioxide concentra-
tions in the atmosphere. Carbon dioxide in the atmosphere re-
32. See, e.g., Rachel Warren, Impacts of Global Climate Change at Different Annual Mean
Global Temperature Increases, in AVOIDING DANGEROUS CLIMATE CHANGE 93, 93-100 (Hans
Joachim Schellnhuber et al. eds., 2006) (noting that surpassing a 2°C increase in global
annual mean temperatures will cause millions of people to be displaced, go hungry, be
exposed to increased risk of malaria and other diseases, and experience increased water
stress, and that at such temperatures Arctic ecosystems will begin to collapse, leading many
species-including polar bears-to go extinct).
33. UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, GLOBAL WARMING SCIENCE: GLOBAL
WARMING FAQ http://www.ucsusa.org/global-warming/science-andimpacts/science/
global-warming-faq.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2008).
34. E.g., Bert Metz & Detlef van Vuuren, How, and at What Costs, Can Low-Level Stabili-
zation Be Achieved?-An Overview, in AVOIDING DANGEROUS CLIMATE CHANGE 337, 337
(HansJoachim Schellnhuber et al. eds., 2006).
35. IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 16, at 37.
36. The worst case scenario in the most recent IPCC Synthesis Report shows green-
house gas emissions stabilizing at the equivalent of 1,550 ppm of atmospheric carbon diox-
ide. Id. at 45 tbl.3.1 n.c.
2009]
HeinOnline  -- 28 Stan. Envtl. L. J. 13 2009
14 STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LA WJOURNAL
mains for many decades or even centuries." As a result, we are
unlikely to see the positive effects of any reductions in carbon di-
oxide emissions until the second half of this century."8 To put it
differently, the damage we already have done cannot be mitigated
for nearly half a century; our best hope in the near term is to take
sufficient steps to limit further damage and to protect ourselves
from the catastrophic effects that could occur.
B. The Inadequacy of Historical Efforts to Address Greenhouse Gas
Emissions and Global Warming
The magnitude of the global warming problem has increased
because of the alarming failure of past efforts to reduce green-
house gas emissions and prevent further warming. While public
and political attention to global climate change has reached a
point where action now is possible, scientists have issued warnings
about the dangers of an excess buildup of greenhouse gases for
more than a century. An Irish physicist named John Tyndall began
researching the atmospheric effects of carbon dioxide nearly 150
years ago."° Around the turn of the twentieth century, Swedish
chemist Svante Arrhenius asserted that increasing levels of atmos-
pheric carbon dioxide would lead to higher global temperatures."
In the decades that followed, other European scientists ex-
plored the possible climatic effects of burning fossil fuels, and by
the 1950s a number of prominent American scientists had begun
37. See, e.g., NAT'L ACAD. OFSCI. et al., supra note 20, at 16.
38. E.g., NICHOLAS STERN, THE STERN REVIEW: THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE
CHANGE i (2007), available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/4/3/Executive_
Summary.pdf ("The effects of our actions now on future changes in the climate have long
lead times. What we do now can have only a limited effect on the climate over the next 40
or 50 years.").
39. E.g., Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, Biography of John Tyndall,
FRS, DCL, LLD, http://www.tyndall.ac.uk/general/history/ohn-tyndall-biography.shtml
(last visited Sept. 26, 2008). See also ELIZABETH KOLBERT, FIELD NOTES FROM A
CATASTROPHE: MAN, NATURE, AND CLIMATE CHANGE 35-36 (2006).
40. E.g., Patricio A. Bernal, Preface to GUY JACQUES & HERVi LE TREUT, CLIMATE
CHANGE 5 (2005). Arrhenius's calculations in 1896 were later found to be surprisingly ac-
curate, although he erred greatly in assuming that it would take thousands of years for
humans to double the amount of atmospheric carbon dioxide. BROWN, supra note 24, at
14.
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similar research.4 A 1963 meeting of the Conservation Foundation
concluded that increased carbon dioxide emissions would lead to a
significant temperature increase.42 By 1965, President Lyndon B.
Johnson told Congress that humans have "altered the composition
of the atmosphere on a global scale through ... a steady increase
in carbon dioxide from the burning of fossil fuels. 43 A year later,
the National Academy of Sciences concluded that carbon dioxide
increases could lead to "inadvertent weather modification."'
Warnings continued throughout the 1970s, and in 1979, the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences published the Charney Report, which
concluded "[i]f carbon dioxide continues to increase, the study
group finds no reason to doubt that climate changes will result and
no reason to believe that these changes will be negligible."'4 5
By the early 1980s, many scientists believed that greenhouse
gases threatened to bring about a dangerous global warming
trend, and these scientists and the scientific organizations that
supported them tried to persuade government officials to pay at-
tention to the issue.46 By 1985, "growing scientific evidence" of cli-
mate change placed the issue on the political agenda.47 When the
World Commission on Environment and Development (later
known as the Brundtland Commission) published Our Common Fu-
ture in 1987, climate change from carbon dioxide emissions was
listed first among four "disturbing" environmental risks associated
41. E.g., Naomi Oreskes, The Long Consensus on Climate Change, WASH. POST, Feb. 1,
2007, at Al5.
42. CLIVE L. SPASH, GREENHOUSE ECONOMICS 12 (2002).
43. Oreskes, supra note 41, atA15.
44. Id.
45. NAT'L ACAD. OF SC., CARBON DIOXIDE AND CLIMATE: A SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT
viii (1979). The Charney Report was prepared by the National Academy of Sciences after
Congress enacted the National Climate Program Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-367, 92 Stat.
601 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C §§ 2901-08 (Westlaw 2008)), which directed the
President to further study potential climate change.
46. ANDREW E. DESSLER & EDWARD A. PARSON, THE SCIENCE AND POLITICS OF
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 12 (2006); see also SPETH, supra note 18, at 55 ("For the past
quarter-century, the international scientific community and others have been sounding
ever-louder warnings that earth's climate, the climate that has sustained natural and hu-
man communities throughout history, is now seriously threatened by atmospheric pollu-
tion.").
47. Bernal, supra note 40, at 5; accord SPASH, supra note 42, at 13 (noting that a "sci-
entific consensus" had developed in 1985).
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with our high energy use.4" The Commission also noted that "we
already know enough to warrant action" on global threats such as
climate change and stated that it was "urgent" that countries begin
working on international agreements to reduce greenhouse
gases.49
The scientific studies of the 1970s and 1980s did not result in
significant action by the United States to combat global climate
change. Congress passed the National Climate Program Act in
1978,0 which directed the President to establish a program to "un-
derstand and respond" to potential global climate change and re-
sulted in the Charney Report, which predicted significant climate
change if carbon dioxide emissions continued to increase.51 In
1987, Congress passed the Global Climate Protection Act, which
required EPA to propose a "coordinated national policy on global
climate change,"52 in essence nothing more than had been man-
dated a decade earlier by the National Climate Program Act.
In 1988, the United States experienced a heat wave and an en-
suing drought, which happened to coincide with a hearing by the
Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources on the
greenhouse effect.53 The chief expert witness was NASA scientist
Dr. James Hansen, who stated that-based upon his own studies as
well as a comprehensive review of scientific research-he was
ninety-nine percent certain that human activities were leading to
increased global temperatures.54 Dr. Hansen's testimony has been
described in the following manner:
[A]fter several other authorities supported [Dr. Hansen's] find-
ings, forecast a wide range of effects (none pleasant), and called
for strong action to reduce fossil fuel emissions[,] reporters gath-
ered around the table asking questions. In response to one query,
48. REPORT OF THE WORLD COMM'N ON ENV'T AND DEV.: OUR COMMON FUTURE ch.
7, 11 (1987), available at http://www.un-documents.net/wced-ocf.htm.
49. Id. at ch. 1, 32, ch. 7, 23.
50. See National Climate Program Act, supra note 45.
51. See Charney Report, supra note 45.
52. Pub. L. No. 100-204, Title XI, § 1103(b), 101 Stat. 1407 (1987) (codified in note
following 15 U.S.C § 2901 (Westlaw 2008)).
53. E.g., BILL McKIBBEN, THE END OF NATURE 23 (1989).
54. Id. at 24.
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Hansen said, "It's time to stop waffling so much. It's time to say
the earth is getting warmer."'
The United Nations established the Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1990, which led to the adoption of
an international treaty at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Ja-
neiro-the precursor to the Kyoto Protocol.5 6 Throughout the
UNFCCC negotiations, the United States made clear that it was
opposed to enforceable reduction targets, since President George
H. W. Bush was unwilling to agree to any measures that might
jeopardize the United States economy or lifestyle." Although mo-
mentum had been building toward mandatory reductions in
greenhouse gases, the United States exerted its influence to limit
the scope of the Rio agreement and avoid committing to any man-
datory reductions.5"
The 1997 Kyoto Protocol was the first international agreement
with mandatory limits on greenhouse gas emissions.59 Under the
Kyoto Protocol, developed nations agreed to decrease their emis-
sions by 2012 by at least five percent below 1990 levels on average."
Once more, however, the United States objected to mandatory
emission controls based on economic concerns.6 The United
States was particularly vocal in its protests about the lack of manda-
tory limits on the emissions of developing nations.6" Although the
55. Id. at 26.
56. The non-binding UNFCCC agreement signed in 1992 sought to reduce green-
house gas emissions to 1990 levels. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change art. 4(2) (b), May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849 (entered into force Mar. 21, 1994).
57. BROWN, supra note 24, at 23.
58. SPASH, supra note 42, at 17-18; see also BROWN, supra note 24, at 19 (noting that
the United States "often resist[ed] proposals that had the support of many nations") ;
FRED PEARCE, THE LAST GENERATION: HOW NATURE WILL TAKE HER REVENGE FOR
CLIMATE CHANGE 15 (2007) (referring to the 1992 Earth Summit as representing a
"fail[ure] to act decisively").
59. Introduction to Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (entered into force Feb. 16, 2005).
60. See id. at art. 3.
61. E.g., BROWN, supra note 24, at 34 ("Just as in the 1992 Earth Summit negotia-
tions, the United States entered the Kyoto negotiations holding, along with Australia, the
least environmentally protective position among major players.... President Clinton had
been convinced by his economic advisers to go slow because of potential adverse economic
impacts on the U.S. economy if the proposals of other nations were adopted at Kyoto.").
62. E.g., id. at 32.
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United States made the symbolic gesture of signing the agreement,
it did so only while stating that it would not submit the agreement
to the United States Senate for ratification until major developing
countries agreed to do more.63 Indeed, at the time it would have
been futile to submit the agreement for ratification, since the Sen-
ate had already stated in a 95-0 Resolution that it was the "sense of
the Senate" that the United States should not sign any agreement
that did not require developing countries to limit their own emis-
sions.'
During the Bush Administration, the United States did not re-
lent in its opposition to mandatory limits on greenhouse gas emis-
sions. President George W. Bush publicly stated his opposition to
the Kyoto Protocol,6" which prompted a fierce international reac-
tion," as might have been expected since over 175 other coun-
tries-representing near unanimity throughout the entire world-
have ratified the protocol.67 The United States and Kazakhstan are
the only countries that signed but have not ratified the Kyoto Pro-
tocol.
Although the Kyoto Protocol was an important step in the right
direction, commentators have noted that it was "but a baby step in
reducing world carbon use and output."68 Since 1997, the interna-
tional community has had regular meetings to find agreement on
additional limits on emissions and to extend the reduction re-
quirements beyond 2012. The 2001 meeting of the United Nations
Climate Change Convention resulted in the Marrakech Accords,
which recognized the need for going beyond the steps taken in the
Kyoto Protocol, although it fell far short of mandating the much
larger reductions that many scientists say are needed.69
63. JACQUES & LE TREUT, supra note 40, at 132.
64. S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997) (enacted).
65. E.g., SPASH, supra note 42, at 18 ("[T]he election of Bush (junior) immediately
led to the US administration boycotting the Protocol. ).
66. E.g., BROWN, supra note 24, at 40.
67. United Nations, Kyoto Protocol Status of Ratification, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_
protocol/background/status of ratification/items/2613.php (last visited Mar. 10, 2008).
68. GARY BRAASCH, EARTH UNDER FIRE: HOW GLOBAL WARMING IS CHANGING THE
WORLD 176 (2007).
69. See U.N. Framework Cony. on Climate Change [UNFCCC], The Marrakech Accords
and the Marrakech Declaration, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.2 (Oct. 11, 2001), avail-
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The most significant efforts to control greenhouse gas emis-
sions have occurred in the European Union, which has also initi-
ated its own climate policy. The European Union climate policy
includes an agreement among its member nations to impose a cap
and trade system to meet the reductions required by the Kyoto
Protocol.70 Yet, during the Bush Administration, even as our allies
agreed to limit carbon dioxide emissions, the United States con-
tinued to insist that developing nations must commit to green-
house gas reductions before the United States would take manda-
tory action. President Bush declared that the United States would
look to economic growth to "provide[] the resources for invest-
ment in clean technologies."'" Some commentators described this
position as stating that "growth is the solution and not the prob-
lem."72 The Bush Administration's position aligned with the his-
torical view of the oil and gas industries, a "business as usual ap-
proach" that failed to take into account the damages associated
with greenhouse gas emissions.73 In this sense, President Bush's po-
sition was not all that different from the 1997 Senate Resolution,
which also called for opposing any international agreement that
"would result in serious harm to the economy of the United
States.71
Even when the United States has passed related legislation, it
has often fallen far short of European efforts. For instance, recent
legislation in the United States now requires major automakers to
meet an increased standard of thirty-five miles per gallon on aver-
able at http://unfccc.int/cop7/documents/accords-draft.pdf (draft unedited version).
70. See European Union Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading Scheme (2005),
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2008).
71. JACQUES & LE TREUT, supra note 40, at 132 (citing a Feb. 14, 2002 statement by
President Bush).
72. Id. at para. 1.
73. See BROWN, supra note 24, at 16 (recognizing similarities between the views of
past administrations and the views of coal and petroleum interests); cf. HARVEY BLATr,
AMERICA'S ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT CARD 151 (2005) (citing Ivan Illich) ("All our leaders
now call themselves environmentalists. But their brand of environmentalism poses very few
challenges to the present system.").
74. S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997) (enacted). Notably, many American businesses
have indicated that they are not opposed to emissions reduction measures. See, e.g., BILL
McKIBBEN, FIGHT GLOBAL WARMING Now 14 (2007) ("Business isn't opposed to action.
One company after another has shown that it can cut carbon emissions and save money in
the process.").
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age by 2020,"5 whereas Europe already requires an average of forty
miles per gallon.76 As a result, the most significant efforts in the
United States to address climate change have occurred at the state
and local level.7 California has been particularly aggressive in pass-
ing state legislation to curb greenhouse gas emissions, and more
than twenty other states have also pursued similar efforts.78 At the
local level, more than 500 mayors have signed a pledge to under-
take efforts to cut greenhouse gas emissions and to encourage ac-
tion at the state and federal level.79 Unfortunately, their pleas for
federal legislation have gone unanswered.
II. THE LEADING ALTERNATIVES FOR REDUCING CARBON DIOXIDE
EMISSIONS
There is no silver bullet for addressing global warming, but
climatologists agree that the most important first step is to curtail
the' growth of carbon dioxide emissions and, as expeditiously as
possible, to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. Even the Bush Ad-
ministration, which steadfastly opposed any mandatory reductions
in greenhouse gas emissions, eventually recognized the need to
lower carbon dioxide emissions." The Administration's voluntary
emissions reduction approach, most notably the ENERGY STAR
program, produced some successes, such as when Wal-Mart Corpo-
75. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, § 102, 121
Stat. 1492 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 32902 (Westlaw 2008)).
76. E.g., Peter Fairley, The New CAFE Standards: Fuel Standards Will Likely Be Achievable
but Won't Encourage Innovation, TECH. REv., Jan. 15, 2008, www.technologyreview.com/
Energy/20067.
77. See generally Kirsten H. Engel and Barak Y. Orbach, Micro-Motives and State and
Local Climate Change Initiatives, 2 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV 119 (2008) (cataloguing state and
local efforts in the United States and analyzing incentives for state and local efforts that
provide global, not local, benefits).
78. E.g., Eric Kelderman, Greenhouse-Gas Limits Gain Steam in States, STATELINE.ORG,
May 1, 2007, http://www.stateline.org/live/details/story?contentld=203932.
79. See U.S. Conference of Mayors Climate Protection Agreement,
http://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/agreement.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2008).
80. See generally Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, No-
tice of Denial of Petition for Rulemaking, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922-02, 52,931-33 (Sept. 8, 2003)
(detailing the Administration's approach of creating "near-term voluntary actions and in-
centives" to reduce greenhouse gas emissions).
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ration installed energy efficient lighting systems in stores across the
country.8
1
But the notion that voluntary measures, even with government
support, can produce the necessary reductions in greenhouse gas
emissions is beyond wishful thinking. Indeed, during the eight
years of the Bush Administration, carbon dioxide emissions in the
United States continued to grow.s2 As noted above, the United
States remains a leading source of greenhouse gas emissions, and it
is unlikely that the developed world will agree to mandatory reduc-
tions in 2012, if the United States has not taken steps to reduce its
emissions before then. The new President and Congress in 2009
face the imperative of adopting measures to control greenhouse
gas emissions in the United States and thereby establishing Ameri-
can credibility for the international negotiations on the next cli-
mate change treaty.
This Part reviews the leading alternatives for reducing carbon
dioxide emissions. This analysis begins with an evaluation of possi-
ble regulatory approaches under the Clean Air Act that could be
utilized to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. This Part then out-
lines the market-based approaches of a carbon tax and cap and
trade, which could be implemented to reduce carbon dioxide
emissions in the United States.
A. Regulatory Limits on Carbon Dioxide Emissions
Historically, the United States has imposed regulatory controls
to curtail pollution through a combination of regulatory emission
controls, technology-forcing requirements, and permit limits. En-
vironmentalists have long argued that the Clean Air Act provides a
vehicle for limiting carbon dioxide emissions. Now that the Su-
preme Court has made clear that carbon dioxide falls within the
81. See Press Release, Wal-Mart Corporation, Wal-Mart Named ENERGY STAR part-
ner (Aug. 2, 2001), available at http://www.walmartfacts.com/articles/3809.aspx. The fed-
eral government's ENERGY STAR program has been called the "crown jewel" of voluntary
emission reduction programs, resulting in greenhouse gas emission reductions during
2004 that were equivalent to eliminating 23 million cars in the United States. Tom Kerr,
Voluntary Climate Change Efforts, in GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW 591, 605-06
(Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2007).
82. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 26.
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definition of an air pollutant,83 there are a number of ways that
carbon dioxide emission controls could be imposed under the
Clean Air Act, which the United States Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) acknowledged duringJuly 2008, when it released an
Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking regarding the regula-
tion of greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act.84
1. A National Ambient Air Quality Standard for carbon dioxide under
Title I of the Clean Air Act.
EPA could identify carbon dioxide as a criteria pollutant and
set a National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) for carbon
dioxide under Title I of the Clean Air Act. 5 It is not readily appar-
ent how an ambient air quality standard would be set for carbon
dioxide, particularly since the United States, although a major
emitter, is not the only source of harmful carbon dioxide emis-
sions. But, theoretically, EPA might attempt to extrapolate an "ac-
ceptable" level of carbon dioxide emissions based on a target for
carbon dioxide concentrations and a corresponding determina-
tion of how much carbon dioxide emissions may occur without ex-
ceeding that concentration. The Agency then could determine
how much of the acceptable level of global carbon dioxide emis-
sions should be allotted to the United States and in turn allocate
those emissions on a per capita basis to the states for purposes of
83. In Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007), the Supreme
Court held that greenhouse gases fit "well within the Clean Air Act's capacious definition
of 'air pollutant."'
84. See Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Regulating Greenhouse Gases Un-
der the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,354 (July 30, 2008). While our discussion focuses on
how EPA could regulate carbon dioxide emissions under the Clean Air Act, Congress also
could enact new legislation providing comparable authority to EPA to regulate emissions.
We believe that the Clean Air Act already provides adequate authority for traditional regu-
lation of greenhouse gas emissions, and the Supreme Court has so held with regard to
emissions from motor vehicles, so we do not discuss alternative statutory schemes that
could be enacted. See.Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. at 532.
85. See 42 U.S.C. § 7408 (Wesdaw 2008) (criteria pollutants), 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (West-
law 2008) (National Ambient Air Quality Standards). In 2003, the attorneys general of
Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Maine filed notice of intent to sue EPA to require the
agency to regulate carbon dioxide under 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408-09, but later voluntarily termi-
nated their suit without prejudice pending a determination of whether EPA had the au-
thority to regulate carbon dioxide emissions under the Clean Air Act. Jonathan S. Martel
& Kerri L. Stelcen, Clean Air Act Regulation, in GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW,
supra note 81, at 144-45.
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setting a NAAQS. If EPA were to do so, the states would be re-
quired to modify their Clean Air Act State Implementation Plans86
to indicate how they would meet the new NAAQS for carbon diox-
ide.
One advantage of using the existing NAAQS approach under
Title I of the Clean Air Act is that it would not require. new legisla-
tion, although EPA would need to pursue a rulemaking to identify
carbon dioxide as a criteria pollutant (and to set an appropriate
ambient air quality standard for carbon dioxide). Another advan-
tage is that, while Title I only has been used for six pollutants to
date,87 it is a well-established method of addressing air pollution in
the United States. A third advantage is that all sources of carbon
dioxide emissions could be addressed, including activities beyond
the burning of fossil fuels, such as deforestation, which contribute
to the increase in carbon dioxide concentrations in the atmos-
phere.88 Yet another advantage, at least in some respects, is that
implementation would be left to the states, which would allow each
state to adopt the emission control programs that make sense
given the unique features of the state's 'industrial base, energy use,
and land use policies, as well as the availability of alternative en-
ergy in that state.
It is far from clear, however, that a meaningful National Ambi-
ent Air Quality Standard could be set for carbon dioxide. The
NAAQS that have been set to date are based on toxicological find-
ings regarding the harmful effects of the pollutants involved.89
While there is no question that carbon dioxide emissions will have
harmful effects over time, their impact is generally less direct than
the other criteria pollutants. Particulate matter, for example, is a
criteria pollutant because it causes asthma and other respiratory
86. See42 U.S.C. § 7410 (Westlaw 2008).
87. EPA has identified carbon monoxide, lead, nitrogen oxide, ozone, particulates,
and sulfur dioxide as criteria pollutants under 42 U.S.C. § 7408. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Na-
tional Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), http://epa.gov/air/criteria.html (last
visited Nov. 5, 2008).
88. See, e.g., IPCC REPORT, supra note 9, at 4-5 fig.SPM.3 (noting that carbon dioxide
emissions from deforestation, organic decay, and peatlands account for over seventeen
percent of global anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, although much of these emis-
sions occur outside of the United States in the less developed parts of the world).
89. See generally 40 C.F.R. § 50 (2008).
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difficulties. Carbon dioxide emissions, on the other hand, lead to
harmful global warming, but it is the effects of the resulting cli-
mate change, not the carbon dioxide emissions themselves, that
cause significant health effects. In this regard, carbon dioxide is
unlike other pollutants that are regulated under the Clean Air Act;
indeed, absent the greenhouse effect, carbon dioxide would not
be considered a pollutant."0
Moreover, it is the aggregate effect of carbon dioxide emissions
that is so damaging, because of the resulting build-up of carbon
dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere. As a result, each state
contributes to the global warming problem, yet the Clean Air Act
concepts of "attainment" and "non-attainment" with ambient air
quality standards would have little meaning where carbon dioxide
emissions are involved. For traditional air pollutants, attainment
means that air quality within that state (or regions within the state)
is within acceptable limits from a human health standpoint; the air
is "safe" to breathe. But safe levels of carbon dioxide emissions can
only be attained when emission reductions occur throughout the
United States-and the rest of the world. 91
2. Carbon dioxide emission standards for motor vehicles under Title H
of the Clean Air Act.
As argued by the combination of environmental groups and
states that sought the petition for rulemaking addressed by the Su-
preme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA, the government could limit
90. While carbon dioxide might not be considered a pollutant, absent climate
change, carbon dioxide emissions limit the effectiveness of the Clean Air Act's regulation
of ozone and its pollutant precursors. Increased temperatures from carboih dioxide, and
the associated increases in atmospheric water vapor, increase the formation of ozone in
the lower atmosphere. For a given level of smog precursors (already regulated under the
Clean Air Act), carbon dioxide pollution directly increases the health impacts from the
resulting ozone. See Mark Z. Jacobson, On the Causal Link Between Carbon Dioxide and Air Pol-
lution Mortality, 35 GEOPHYS. RES. LETrERS L03809 (2008).
91. An alternative method of controlling greenhouse gas emissions under Title I of
the Clean Air Act would be for EPA to set New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) for
Carbon Dioxide under 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (Westlaw 2008). Under the NSPS program, car-
bon dioxide emission limits could be imposed on newly constructed facilities, or on facili-
ties that underwent major modifications. NSPS controls might help limit the growth of
carbon dioxide emissions; however, they would not lead to significant reductions from ex-
isting sources of carbon dioxide emissions. See generally Martel & Stelcen, supra note 85, at
145-47.
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carbon dioxide emissions from motor vehicles. Title II of the
Clean Air Act requires EPA to regulate "the emission of any air pol-
lutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor
vehicle engines, which in [the Administrator's] judgment cause, or
contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to
endanger public health and welfare. 9 2 As noted above, the Su-
preme Court already has held that carbon dioxide is an "air pol-
lutant" under the Clean Air Act,93 and EPA arguably has made the
requisite endangerment finding in the course of refusing to grant
a waiver for California's effort to regulate carbon dioxide emis-
sions from automobiles in California.94
There are compelling arguments for regulation of carbon diox-
ide emissions from motor vehicles under the Clean Air Act, not the
least of which is that the text of the statute requires it once EPA
makes the requisite endangerment finding.9 5 Carbon dioxide emis-
sions from motor vehicles account for approximately one-fourth of
annual carbon dioxide emissions in the United States. 6 As a result,
by requiring more stringent emission controls under Title II of the
Clean Air Act, EPA would address a leading source of carbon diox-
ide emissions. Emission controls for motor vehicles could be ex-
pected to have a significant effect on greenhouse gas emissions,
once the requisite pollution control devices were developed and
implemented in new motor vehicles.
But even if EPA were to exercise its authority to limit motor ve-
hicle emissions under the Clean Air Act, meaningful carbon diox-
92. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (Westlaw 2008), as quoted in Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 528 (2007).
93. Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. at 500.
94. See California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards; Notice of Deci-
sion Denying a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California's 2009 and Subsequent
Model Year Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for New Motor Vehicles, 73 Fed. Reg.
12,156-01 (Mar. 6, 2008). While EPA claims it did not make an endangerment finding
when it rejected California's waiver request, the denial states that "warming of the climate
system is unequivocal" and notes the likelihood of global sea level rise, heat waves, intense
weather, wildfire, and insect outbreaks that arguably are tantamount to an endangerment.
finding. Id. at 12,165.
95. Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. at 533.
96. Advance Notice of Public Rulemaking, supra note 85 at 44,403 (July 30, 2008)
("Transportation activities . . . accounted for approximately 28% of all GHG emissions in
2006 ...").
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ide emission reductions from automobiles would not occur for
some time. Any proposed rulemaking regarding carbon dioxide
emissions from motor vehicles would take time to develop within
EPA9v and then would be the subject of extensive negotiations with
the auto industry and environmental groups before EPA could is-
sue a final rule. Once the rulemaking was completed, the auto in-
dustry would need time to develop the necessary technology to
improve fuel economy and/or limit carbon dioxide emissions. As a
practical matter, therefore, carbon dioxide emission limits for mo-
tor vehicles could not be effective for at least several years.
In addition, once motor vehicle emission limits became effec-
tive, they only would affect new cars; existing cars, manufactured at
a time when there were no carbon dioxide emission limits under
the Clean Air Act, would not be affected. With many Americans
owning their cars longer 9S-and new vehicles likely to be more ex-
pensive because of the cost of installing better pollution control
equipmente9 -it would be several years more before the majority of
cars were lower emission vehicles. As a result, while emission con-
trols for motor vehicles warrant consideration as part of a compre-
hensive effort to limit greenhouse gas emissions, they would not be
an effective measure for immediate reductions of carbon dioxide
emissions.'°
97. Cf., e.g., Robert L. Glicksman, Balancing Mandate and Discretion in the Institutional
Design of Federal Climate Change Policy, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 196, 209 (2008) (recognizing that
in general agencies often have an incentive "to delay in issuing regulations").
98. E.g., Joseph Siano, 533,000 Miles and It Runs Like a Top, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2007,
at 4 ("[C]ars are indeed staying on the road longer.").
99. For instance, fuel-efficient hybrid vehicles currently cost more up front than their
gas-only counterparts, although when long-term costs are taken into account, hybrids may
be a better deal. See, e.g., Douglas MacMillan & Matt Vella, Hybrids Cost-Efficient over Long
Haul, BUS. WK.,Jan. 9, 2007, available at http://www.businessweek.com/autos/content/
jan2007/bw20070108_774581.htm ("Astudy released today by auto industry analysts at
IntelliChoice shows that all of the 22 hybrid models currently sold in the U.S. will save
owners money thanks to lower total cost of ownership, compared with competing vehi-
cles."). Nonetheless, because up front costs often play a disproportionately large role in
consumer choice, many consumers may be unwilling to pay extra for long-term savings.
See, e.g., Sven Gustafson, Slow Hybrid Vehicle Sales Growth Predicted, BUS. REV., Jan. 31, 2008,
available at http://www.mlive.com/naias/index.ssf/2008/0 1/slow -hybridvehicle sales_
grow.html (noting than consumers have become accepting of high gas prices and are of-
ten unwilling to pay a premium for hybrid vehicles).
100. Reductions in carbon dioxide emission levels from automobiles may take time
under any approach, because of the relative inelasticity of demand for gasoline (particu-
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3. Permits for major sources of carbon dioxide emissions under Title V
of the Clean Air Act.
EPA and the states could develop a permitting program for
carbon dioxide emissions under Title V of the Clean Air Act.' A
permitting program would be targeted at major stationary sources
that emit carbon dioxide (e.g. power plants, factories, and other
industrial facilities). The states already have authority to regulate
air pollutants from these facilities under Title V of the Clean Air
Act, much as they regulate discharges of water pollutants under
the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System of the Clean
Water Act. Facilities with Title V permits for carbon dioxide emis-
sions would be required to report their emissions to the state issu-
ing the permit on a regular basis and would face the possibility of
violation notices or enforcement actions if they failed to comply
with their Title V permits.
An advantage of using the Title V permitting system to regulate
carbon dioxide emissions, as opposed to making carbon dioxide a
criteria pollutant under Title I, is that Title V limits might be easier
for the states to implement, since they would target the individual
facilities that are the greatest sources of carbon dioxide emissions.
Indeed, if Title V permits were implemented alongside Title II lim-
its on motor vehicle emissions, EPA and the states could address
the most significant sources of carbon dioxide emissions without
many of the administrative hurdles (and legal challenges) that
would be faced if carbon dioxide were identified as a criteria pol-
lutant. In addition, if Title V permits incorporated technology-
forcing performance standards, they might allow the states to en-
courage innovation at both existing and new facilities.
A permitting system under Title V, however, would have many
of the same shortcomings as motor vehicle emission limits under
Title II. First, a Title V permitting program Would take time to de-
velop and implement. The states would need to determine, in con-
sultation with EPA, what level of carbon dioxide emissions could
larly in areas where there is insufficient mass transit). Our argument here simply is that
market-based approaches would become effective much sooner-and therefore would
provide incremental reductions of motor vehicle emissions more quickly-than motor ve-
hicle emission controls enacted under Title II.
101. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7661-7661f (Westlaw 2008).
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be tolerated (much as would need to occur on a national level to
set a Title I national ambient. air quality standard). Second, the fa-
cilities that were covered by the permit requirement would need to
apply for permits based on their historical emissions and the avail-
ability of technology to reduce their future emissions. Once per-
mits were issued, legal challenges might ensue if the limitations
were too stringent and, even without legal delays, facilities would
need time to implement any changes that were required to meet
the permit limits. As a result, emission reductions under Title V
(like under Title II) would not be seen for several years.
Finally, while leaving regulation to the states has benefits in
many other contexts, it is far less clear that state regulation is the
best approach to a problem of national and international scope.
To date, much of the climate change effort has occurred at the
state and local levels,"' and those efforts are laudable, particularly
in the absence of federal action during the Bush Administration.
But experience tells us that the states vary widely in their ap-
proaches to environmental regulation, including the scope of their
Title V permitting programs under the Clean Air Act. As a result,
while a permitting program may be a helpful additional step to
combat climate change, it is unlikely to be a strong enough meas-
ure to achieve the necessary level of overall emission reductions in
the United States.
10 3
B. Market-Based Limits on Carbon Dioxide Emissions
While regulatory tools are available to reduce carbon dioxide
emissions, and their use may be desirable as part of a broad-based
approach to climate change mitigation, most of the debate among
policymakers and scholars has focused on market-based ap-
proaches to limit carbon dioxide emissions. The emphasis on mar-
ket-based approaches may reflect in part the inherent complexity
102. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
103. See generally Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local
Climate Policies 155 U. PENN. L. REV. 1961 (2007) (arguing that state-level action on climate
change is not the best approach). Wiener advocates in favor of an international emissions
trading program, which we believe would not be as effective as a carbon tax in addressing
global climate change, but Wiener makes a compelling argument that individual state ef-
forts are "of limited value, and may even yield perverse results." Id. at 1962.
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of the Clean Air Act and the delays that would face any regulatory
system to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. Indeed, if past experi-
ence under the Clean Air Act is any guide, litigation would ensue
once a new regulatory regime was established, leading to even
greater delays in carbon dioxide reductions."°4
1. The benefits of market-based limits.
The major driving force behind market-based approaches is
the belief that harnessing market forces is critical to developing
the operational changes and alternative technologies needed to
reduce carbon dioxide emissions. Theoretically, reliance on mar-
ket-based forces would allow development of the most innovative
and cost-effective form of carbon dioxide reductions, which may
be less likely to occur if the government mandates particular types
of emission controls under the Clean Air Act or a comparable
statutory scheme focusing on carbon dioxide emission controls.
1 5
104. EPA proposed enacting regulations involving National Ambient Air Quality
Standards in 1997, when the Agency lowered the ozone standards and added a standard
for fine particulate matter. The new standards were immediately challenged, and the legal
issues involved were not resolved under the Supreme Court's decision in Whitman v. Am.
Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001). There was also a contentious decision to lower the
ozone standard in spring 2008. National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 73 Fed.
Reg. 16,436 (Mar. 27, 2008). Both environmental and industry groups were unhappy with
the outcome, and the alleged political nature of the decision was widely criticized. See, e.g.,
Union of Concerned Scientists, EPA to Announce New Ozone Pollution Standard, Mar.
11, 2008, http://www.ucsusa.org/news/press-release/epa-to-announce-new-ozone-
0100.html.
105. Many academics assume that market-based approaches will produce more inno-
vation than traditional regulatory approaches. See, e.g., Stewart and Wiener, supra note 3.
David Driesen challenges the assumption of market advocates, particularly their argument
that emissions trading programs promote greater innovation. See Driesen, supra note 3.
Driesen claims that cap and trade systems only promote innovation by companies that are
selling credits and asserts that traditional regulation can promote innovation more effec-
tively than emissions trading programs. David M. Driesen, Sustainable Development and Mar-
ket Liberalism's Shotgun Wedding: Emissions Trading Under the Kyoto Protocol, 83 IND. L.J. 21, 51-
58 (2008). We agree with Driesen that cap and trade may limit innovation to sellers of
credits and that technology-forcing performance standards can promote innovation effec-
tively. We do not interpret Driesen's arguments to undermine our view that a carbon tax
would provide incentives for innovation, however, particularly when combined with tax
credits for alternative energy and carbon sequestration. Indeed, Driesen acknowledges
that a carbon tax would promote more innovation than a cap and trade system. David M.
Driesen, Economic Instruments for Sustainable Development in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR
SUSTAINABILITY: A CRITICAL READER 303 (Stepan Wood & Benjamin J. Richardson eds.,
2005).
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Some may question whether it is wise to rely on market forces
to respond to a crisis that has been described as a market failure of
epic proportions, since free market forces have failed to account
for the enormous economic and social costs that would accompany
global climate change.' From an economic standpoint, however,
carbon dioxide emissions are the classic externality: emissions oc-
cur at no cost to the emitting facility, but at an enormous cost to
society as a whole.' A central feature of the market-based ap-
proaches, therefore, is developing a price signal for carbon that
incorporates the costs of that externality and drives the market to-
ward finding acceptable alternatives.'
It may be a leap of faith to focus on market-based solutions for
environmental problems that have their origins in the dramatic in-
crease in carbon dioxide emissions that have accompanied indus-
trialization and development around the world during the last 150
years. Yet, precisely because the increase in carbon dioxide emis-
sions is occurring throughout the world and across all sectors of
the global economy, a market-based approach may be the best way
to address all sources of carbon dioxide emissions. 9 In contrast,
the regulatory approaches described above necessarily target indi-
vidual market sectors, which may lead to uneven emission controls.
In addition to promoting cost-effective solutions, market-based
limits allow the significant costs of carbon dioxide emission reduc-
tions to be distributed more evenly across the economy. Any car-
bon mitigation strategy will have economic impacts,"0 and no ap-
proach can eliminate all disproportionate effects, but a market-
106. Executive Summary to STERN, supra note 38, at i ("Climate change presents a
unique challenge for economists. ).
107. Id. at xviii.
108. For this reason, the IPCC states that "an effective carbon price signal could real-
ize significant mitigation potential." IPCC REPORT, supra note 9, at 18.
109. The ability of a market-based approach to affect all sources of carbon dioxide
emissions may depend on the use of an "upstream" market-based approach. See discussion
infta, Part II.B.2. As a matter of regulatory design, a "downstream" approach also could
reach all emission sources, but a downstream approach would be more susceptible to un-
even controls, because of the volume and complexity of the sources involved.
110. Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful US. Cap and Trade System to Address Climate
Change 32 HARV. ENvrL. L. REV. 293, 296 (2008) ("Even a well-designed policy will ulti-
mately impose annual costs on the order of tens and perhaps hundreds of billions of dol-
lars.").
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based strategy is likely to allow costs to be shared most equally, be-
cause it affects the entire economy. Finally, a market-based ap-
proach can be implemented more rapidly than the regulatory ap-
proaches described above, particularly if a carbon tax is utilized.
2. Upstream versus downstream market-based limits.
Both a carbon tax and a cap and trade system could be im-
posed either "upstream" or "downstream." As Part III discusses in
greater detail below, an upstream carbon tax or cap and trade sys-
tem would focus on fossil fuel production (oil, coal, and natural
gas), since together energy use accounts for approximately eighty
percent of carbon dioxide emissions in the United States.111 An up-
stream market-based approach would have the greatest ability to
ensure that all sources of carbon dioxide emissions are affected,
because it focuses on carbon at the point that it enters the econ-
omy.
Alternatively, either a carbon tax or a cap and trade system
could be imposed downstream on the facilities that are the major
sources of carbon dioxide emissions. A downstream approach
would focus on the same facilities that would likely be regulated
under state implementation plans (if carbon dioxide became a cri-
teria pollutant) or under Title V permits. A well-designed down-
stream approach could also reach all sectors of the economy, ena-
bling costs to be distributed as evenly as an upstream approach.
The challenge under a downstream approach is the number
and kinds of facilities that would be monitored and the inherent
difficulty in reaching all forms of energy use, most notably motor
vehicle use and electricity, which contribute significantly to carbon
dioxide emissions. The broader range of facilities to be monitored
would heighten the administrative complexity; the increased num-
ber of facilities would require greater resources for compliance as-
surance and enforcement. In addition, it is not clear how energy
use by individuals would be addressed, despite their significant
contribution to the carbon dioxide emissions problem. For these
reasons, either a carbon tax or a cap and trade system would be
easier to implement under an upstream approach, with a more
111. Advance Notice of Public Rulemaking, supra note 84, at 44,402.
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targeted approach to polluting facilities and motor vehicles per-
haps coming over time through regulation under the Clean Air
Act.
3. Key features of a carbon tax and cap and trade.
An upstream carbon tax arguably is the most straightforward
approach to the global climate change problem. A carbon tax
would be imposed on all oil, coal, and natural gas production in
the United States, as well as all imports. The tax rate would be
based on the marginal cost of carbon dioxide emissions (also re-
ferred to as the "social cost of carbon")1 2 and would be increased
annually to reflect the increase in the harmful effects of carbon di-
oxide emissions. A carbon tax thereby would provide a price signal
that captures what is now an externality, namely the harmful ef-
fects of carbon dioxide emissions. '13 Tax credits would be provided
for carbon sequestration programs, which eliminate or reduce
carbon dioxide emissions (and, in some circumstances, could be
used to generate energy). Tax revenues would be used to expand
tax credits for development of alternative energy and to address
any regressive effects of the carbon tax.
If the carbon tax did not produce the desired reduction in car-
bon dioxide emissions, the tax would be increased; if the tax
"overcorrected" and produced greater than anticipated reduc-
112. The IPCC reports that peer-reviewed estimates of the social costs of carbon di-
oxide emissions had an average value of $12 per ton of carbon dioxide (or $43 per metric
ton of carbon). INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE
2007, IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 17 (2007)
[hereinafter IPCC IMPACTS SUMMARY].
113. Existing carbon tax proposals reflect a range of carbon tax rates. For example,
economist William Nordhaus proposes an initial tax of $7.40 per ton of carbon dioxide (or
$27 per metric ton of carbon), with 2 to 3 percent annual increases. WILLIAM NORDAUS, A
QUESTION OF BALANCE: WEIGHING THE OPTIONS ON GLOBAL WARMING POLICIES 15-16
(2008). Robert Shapiro proposes an initial tax of $14 per ton of carbon dioxide (or $50
per metric ton of carbon) with annual increases of approximately $2 per ton of carbon
dioxide. ROBERT SHAPIRO, NAM PHAM, & ARUN MAuI, ADDRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE
WITHOUT IMPAIRING THE U.S. ECONOMY: THE ECONOMICS AND ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE
OF COMBINING A CARBON-BASED TAx AND TAX RELIEF 15 (2008),
http://www.climatetaskforce.org/pdf/CTF CarbonTaxEarth-Spgs.pdf. The America's
Energy Security Trust Fund Act of 2007, H.R. 3416, 110th Cong. (2007) would impose an
initial tax of $15 per ton of carbon dioxide (or $55 per metric ton of carbon) with ten per-
cent annual increases plus inflationary adjustments based on the cost-of-living index.
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tions, it could be decreased.114 Implementation and enforcement
of a carbon tax would occur through existing programs within the
Internal Revenue Service and the Energy Department. Moreover,
by establishing a carbon tax in advance of any international
agreement on global carbon dioxide emissions, the United States
would meet its obligation to begin reducing its carbon dioxide
emissions and establish much-needed credibility in the ensuing in-
ternational negotiations.
An upstream cap and trade system would establish a cap on the
carbon content of fuels in much the same way that an upstream
carbon tax would impose a tax on those fuels." 5 The cap would de-
cline over time to achieve the desired level of carbon dioxide emis-
sion reductions. Where a cap and trade system becomes more
complicated and, as Part III discusses, potentially unwieldy, is in
the setting of baselines for the distribution of allowances and in
the monitoring and enforcement of a complex allowance system.
Under an upstream cap and trade system, all producers and
importers of fossil fuels would be required to have allowances to
"cover" the carbon content of the fuels they produce. The number
of those allowances would be limited by the overall "cap" imposed
by the system. Allowances could be distributed either for free,
through an auction system, or some combination. The leading cap
and trade proposal in Congress, the Lieberman-Warner Climate
Security Act of 2008,16 would distribute the majority of allowances
for free in the early years of the cap and trade system, with increas-
ing percentages distributed by auction in subsequent years. Absent
an auction, no revenue would be generated by cap and trade to
support the development of alternative energy or carbon seques-
tration technologies. But, theoretically, market forces would pro-
vide a substitute for government subsidies: companies that devel-
oped alternative energy and otherwise found ways to limit their
114. Whether increases would be politically viable is, of course, one of the questions
raised by a carbon tax, although similar questions also arise regarding Whether firm caps
will be politically viable if the price of carbon rises too high under a cap and trade system.
See discussion infra, Part III.C.1.
115. See IPCC IMPACrS SUMMARY, supra note 112, at 17.
116. Climate Security Act of 2008, S. Res. 3036, 110th Cong. (2008) (which substi-
tuted for America's Climate Security Act of 2007, S. Res. 2191, 110th Cong. (2007), for de-
bate by the Senate inJune 2008).
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carbon dioxide emissions would have "surplus" allowances that
they could sell to companies that needed more allowances.
The best example of a cap and trade system on a national level
in the United States is the cap and trade program under Title IV of
the Clean Air Act, which was implemented under the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990 to curtail acid rain."7 The acid rain program
is widely viewed as an overwhelming success, both in terms of the
environmental protection it provided and the degree to which
change occurred without significant economic dislocation. Be-
cause the acid rain problem focused on 111 facilities in the Mid-
west (the so-called "Big Dirties"), however, we do not have experi-
ence in the United States-or the rest of the world-with an
economy-wide cap and trade system."'
In contrast to the limited experience in the U.S. with cap and
trade, carbon taxes have been successfully implemented in a grow-
ing number of countries. Carbon taxes have been implemented in
Quebec and British Columbia as part of Canadian efforts to meet
the requirements of the Kyoto Protocol. In addition, Denmark,
Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden have intro-
duced carbon taxes in combination with energy taxes."' The exist-
ing carbon taxes are too new to draw meaningful conclusions
about their long-term benefits, but many economists believe that a
carbon tax would be the most effective method of reducing carbon
dioxide emissions.' Cap and trade systems for carbon dioxide
emissions have been implemented by the European Union 2' and
on a regional basis in New England;'22 in addition, seven Western
117. Seesupranote 4.
118. In addition, while there is no doubting the success of the Title IV program, the
technological advances necessary to combat acid rain were readily available and relatively
inexpensive, which may not be the case with the technology required for carbon dioxide
emission reductions.
119. David G. Duff, Tax Policy and Global Warming 51 CAN. TAX.J. 2063, 2090 (2003).
120. See, e.g., N. Gregory Mankiw, One Answer to Global Warming. A New Tax, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 16, 2007, at 6. Economists tend to favor taxes because they provide the
clearest price signal, unencumbered by factors like baselines, allowance allocation,
and use of credits. As explained in Part III, we agree with this "purist" view, although
there are at least some economists who nonetheless favor a cap and trade system. See,
e.g., Stavins, supra note 110.
121. See supra note 70.
122. Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative: An Initiative of the Northeastern and Mid-
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states and four Canadian provinces have taken steps to develop a
cap and trade system. 23 As discussed in Part III, the European Un-
ion system has not been particularly successful to date, but that has
not diminished enthusiasm in the United States and abroad for re-
lying on cap and trade systems as the principal method of reducing
carbon dioxide emissions.
III. THE CASE FOR A CARBON TAx
Given the urgency of the global climate change problem, and
the increasing acceptance of a cap and trade system as a desirable
alternative, the argument could be made that a cap and trade sys-
tem should be implemented in the United States (and abroad)
without further delay. This Part provides a comparison between a
carbon tax and a cap and trade system and concludes that a car-
bon tax is preferable to cap and trade.1
24
A. The Theoretical Tradeoff
Both a carbon tax and cap and trade are market-based mecha-
nisms for curbing greenhouse gas emissions, and therefore have
Atlantic States of the U.S., http://www.rggi.org (last visited Mar. 10, 2008).
123. See MKT. ADVISORY COMM. TO THE CAL. AIR RES. BD., RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
DESIGNING A GREENHOUSE GAS CAP-AND-TPADE SYSTEM FOR CALIFORNIA 50-52 (2007)
(recommending a cap and trade system to implement the Global Warming Solutions Act
of 2006 and describing the Western Regional Climate Action Initiative); CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE §§ 38500-99 (Westlaw 2008).
124. For an excellent overview of the issues from a global perspective, see William D.
Nordhaus, To Tax or Not to Tax: Alternative Approaches to Slowing Global Warming, 1 REV.
ENVTL. ECON. & POL'Y 26 (2007). See also Robert N. Stavins, Policy Instruments for Climate
Change: How Can National Governments Address a Global Problem, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 293
(1997); Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation, 29 CAP. U. L. REV.
21 (2001). On environmental taxes, see generally DUFF, supra note 119; Roberta Mann,
Waiting to Exhale? Global Warming and Tax Policy, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 1135 (2002); Gary E.
Marchant, Freezing Carbon Dioxide Emissions: An Offset Policy for Slowing Global Warming, 22
ENVrL. L. 623 (1992); Henry van Egteren, Regulating an Externality-Generating Utility: Envi-
ronmental Taxes Under Limited Information, 21 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 107 (2002); Rich-
ard A. Westin, Understanding Environmental Taxes, 46 TAX LAW. 327 (1993). On the actual
use of carbon taxes in the EU and elsewhere, see, e.g., Johan Albrecht, The Use of Consump-
tion Taxes to Re-launch Green Tax Reforms, 26 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 88 (2006); Jose Marcos
Domingues, Environmental Fees and Compensatory Tax in Brazil, 13 LAW & BUS. REV. OF THE
AM. 279 (2007); ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. AND DEV., ENVIRONMENTALLY RELATED TAXES IN
OECD COUNTRIES 21-31 (2001); AndrewJ. White III, Decentralised Environmental Taxation in
Indonesia: A Proposed Double Dividend for Revenue Allocation and Environmental Regulation, 19 J.
ENVrL. L. 43 (2007).
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advantages over traditional regulatory controls, for the reasons ex-
plained above. 25 However, a carbon tax and cap and trade also dif-
fer in one important theoretical dimension, as well as in many im-
portant practical ones. Cap and trade, because it imposes an
overall cap on the level of emissions permitted in the economy,
provides certainty as to the environmental benefit that results from
its implementation (Benefit Certainty). However, precisely because
it imposes a fixed cap without regard to the cost to the economy at
large or to individual polluters of attaining that cap, cap and trade
suffers from lack of certainty in regard to the cost it imposes (Cost
Certainty). A carbon tax, on the other hand, provides Cost Cer-
tainty because the precise amount of the tax is set in advance.
However, because the effect of imposing a carbon tax on green-
house gas emissions is not knowable in advance, the carbon tax
does not offer Benefit Certainty.
From a purely theoretical perspective, disregarding for the
moment any political implications, it is not clear whether Cost Cer-
tainty or Benefit Certainty is more important. Some scholars have
argued that a focus on Benefit Certainty is superior because it puts
the emphasis on the environment rather than on the economics,
but since any policy imposes important costs, it seems short-sighted
and somewhat misleading to focus only on the benefits.'26 It could
also be argued on the other side that since the benefits of any pol-
icy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions are worldwide and long-
term, while the cost of any policy adopted by the United States will
be confined to the United States and immediate, it is more impor-
tant to focus on the costs rather than the benefits.
Both cap and trade and a carbon tax can be adjusted to miti-
gate Cost and Benefit Uncertainty. A cap and trade regime can
have provisions for borrowing and banking allowances which per-
mit firms burdened with sudden cost increases (e.g., as a result of a
spike in the price of allowances) to alleviate that cost without af-
fecting the overall cap. However, if the price of allowances rises
and remains high as the cap continues to be lowered, one can ex-
125. See discussion supra, Part II.B.3. See also Jesse Ratcliffe, Reenvisioning the Risk
Bubble: Utilizing a System of Intra-Firm Risk Tradingfor Environmental Protection, 92 CAL. L. REV.
1779 (2004).
126. Stavins, supra note 110.
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pect to see political pressure to enact "safety valves" that prevent
the cap from being lowered further, which would impair Benefit
Certainty. 27 Under a carbon tax, the tax rate can be raised or low-
ered as necessary to obtain the needed Benefit Certainty, although
this requires overcoming political opposition every time the gov-
ernment seeks to raise the tax rate.1
28
This Article does not take a position regarding whether Benefit
or Cost Certainty is more important as a purely theoretical mat-
ter. 12 9 Rather, the stated preference for the carbon tax is based on
practical observations regarding its implementation, and this Part
now turns to a discussion of the practical advantages and disadvan-
tages of the carbon tax, as compared to cap and trade.
B. Advantages of a Carbon Tax
1. Simplicity.
The leading cap and trade proposal pending in Congress is the
Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2008.130 It is an exceed-
ingly long and complicated bill of over three hundred pages.
Other cap and trade proposals have similar lengthy and complex
provisions over hundreds of pages. There are far fewer carbon tax
proposals, but the leading one, sponsored by United States Repre-
sentativeJohn B. Larson, is seventeen pages long.'
127. See STEWART & WIENER, supra note 3, at 76.
128. From a public choice perspective, the relative simplicity of a carbon tax, particu-
larly with regard to the number of sources that could be taxed, may make political opposi-
tion more intense-and more effective.
129. Most economists prefer a carbon tax to cap and trade, and the Congressional
Budget Office has estimated that a carbon tax could be five times more cost-efficient than
cap and trade. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUBL'N. NO. 2930, POLICY OPTIONS FOR REDUCING
CO 2 EMISSIONS ch. 1 (2008); See also Kevin Doran & Alaine Ginnochio, United States Climate
Policy: Using Market-Based Strategies to Achieve Greenhouse Gas Emission Reductions, ENVTL. &
ENERGY L. & POL'Y J. 31 (forthcoming 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1015849; John Freebairn, Taxes or Tradable Permits to Reduce Greenhouse Gas
Emissions (June 2008) (unpublished manuscript, paper presented at Musgrave Sympo-
sium, Sydney).
130. See Climate Security Act of 2008, S. Res. 3036, 110th Cong. (2008).
131. See America's Energy Security Trust Fund Act, H.R. 3416, 110th Cong. (2007).
The length of legislative proposals is not determinative of their complexity if enacted,
since the legislative process often adds complexity to what had been streamlined propos-
als. We simply note that, as originally conceived, a carbon tax is far more straightforward
than cap and trade.
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Why is cap and trade so much more complicated than the car-
bon tax? A carbon tax is inherently simple: a tax is imposed at X
dollars per ton of carbon content on the main sources of carbon
dioxide emissions in the economy, namely coal, oil, and natural
gas. (Other greenhouse gas sources, such as methane, are not in-
cluded because energy accounts for nearly eighty-five percent of
the 7147 million metric tons of greenhouse gases in the U.S. econ-
omy. 32) The tax is imposed "upstream," i.e., at the point of extrac-
tion or importation, which means than it can be imposed on only
about 2000 taxpayers (500 coal miners and importers, 750 oil pro-
ducers and importers, and 750 natural gas producers and import-
ers) .13 Credits can be given to carbon sequestration projects and to
other projects that reduce greenhouse gas emissions (although
this would need to be addressed in a way that does not dilute the
price signal or create undue complexity), and exports are ex-
empted. Beyond that, the main question is what to do with the
revenue, which will be discussed below.
Cap and trade, on the other hand, is inherently more compli-
cated. While the cap can also be imposed "upstream," it has several
features that require complexity.' First, baselines need to be set
for purposes of establishing the emissions cap. Second, the pro-
posal needs to determine how allowances will be created and dis-
tributed, either for free or by auction. Free distribution requires
deciding which industries receive allowances, while an auction re-
quires a complex monitoring system to prevent cheating. Third,
the trading in allowances needs to be set up and monitored: a sys-
tem needs to be devised to prevent the same allowance from being
used twice, and penalties need to be established for polluters who
exceed their allowances. Fourth, if allowances are to be traded with
other countries, the international trading of allowances would
need to be monitored as well. Fifth, to prevent Cost Uncertainty,
132. Stavins, supra note 110, at 306 (referring to a U.S. Energy Information Admini-
stration analysis of 2005 emissions).
133. Id. at 21 tbl.2 (citing CAMBRIDGE ENERGY RESEARCH ASSOcS., DESIGN ISSUES FOR
MARKET-BASED GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTION STRATEGIES (2006)).
134. All of these complicating features occur in the Stavins proposal, supra note 111,
and in the various legislative cap and trade proposals. For an overview of the latter, see Vic-
tor B. Flatt, Taking the Legislative Temperature: Which Federal Climate Change Legislative Proposal
is "Best"?, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. 123 (2007).
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cap and trade proposals typically have complex provisions for
banking and borrowing allowances, and some of them provide for
safety valves. Sixth, offsets are needed for carbon sequestration and
similar projects, and those are more complicated than credits
against a carbon tax liability. Finally, most cap and trade proposals
involve provisions for coordinating with the cap and trade policies
of other countries, and for punishing countries that do not have a
greenhouse gas emissions control policy.'
35
It is important to note that this difference in complexity is in-
herent in the two policies as initially proposed, before any legisla-
tive amendments and before any implementation and enforce-
ment issues. A pure cap and trade system is inevitably more
complex than any carbon tax.
Cap and trade is also relatively untried: we have never had an
economy-wide cap and trade system, while we have extensive ex-
perience with economy-wide excise taxes on a wide variety of
products, including gasoline. This is why Congressman Larson's
carbon tax bill can simply envisage adding three new relatively
short sections to the existing excise tax part of the Internal Reve-
nue Code.136 Cap and trade, on the other hand, is a major new and
separate piece of legislation. A new administration determined to
implement cap and trade would probably have to take at least two
years to get the program passed in Congress and set up for imple-
mentation, even with swift Congressional action, because of the
inherent delays in the rulemaking process. A carbon tax can be
enacted and enforced practically tomorrow. Given that we have al-
ready delayed action for decades, and that every year that passes
makes the climate change problem more difficult to solve, a car-
bon tax may be preferable to cap and trade-as well as traditional
regulatory approaches-based on timing concerns alone.
In addition to its inherent complexity, cap and trade also is
more difficult to enforce. Under cap and trade, an elaborate
mechanism would need to be set up to distribute and collect al-
lowances and to ensure that allowances are real (a difficult task,
135. On the complexity of imposing tariffs to punish other countries, which may be a
violation of the WTO agreements, see Copenhagen Seminar on Trade and Climate
Change, June 18-20, 2008, Summary Notes: Session on Border Carbon Adjustments.
136. America's Energy Security Trust Fund Act, H.R. 3416, 110th Cong. (2007).
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especially if allowances from non-United States programs are per-
mitted) and that polluters are penalized if they emit greenhouses
gases without an allowance. A new administrative body would need
to be set up for this purpose, or at least a new office within EPA,
and new employees with the relevant expertise would need to be
hired. A carbon tax, on the other hand, could be enforced by the
IRS with its existing staff, which has the relevant expertise in en-
forcing other excise taxes.
Cap and trade also raises collateral issues that are not present
in a carbon tax, such as the need for the Securities and Exchange
Commission to enforce rules regarding futures trading in allow-
ances. A good example is the tax implications of both policies. A
carbon tax, as a federal tax, has no tax implications: it is simply col-
lected and is not deductible. Allowances under cap and trade, on
the other hand, raise a multitude of tax issues: What are the tax
implications of distributing allowances for free? What are the tax
implications of trading in allowances? Should allowance exchanges
be permitted to avoid the tax on selling allowances? What amount
of the purchase price of a business should be allocated to its allow-
ances? If borrowing and banking occur, what are the tax conse-
quences? Can allowances be amortized? None of these issues arise
under a carbon tax.
2. Revenue.
A carbon tax by definition generates revenue. A relatively
modest tax of $10 per ton of carbon content is estimated to gener-
ate $50 billion per year; the America's Energy Security Trust Fund
Act envisages a tax of $16.50 per ton and generates correspond-
ingly more revenue.'37 While. the current federal budget deficit and
even larger actuarial deficit may justify revenue raising measures in
general, revenues from a carbon tax should be segregated and de-
voted to addressing any regressive effects of the tax and reducing
greenhouse gas emissions. Some carbon tax proposals promise
"revenue neutrality" and focus on eliminating regressive effects. 3 '
137. Id. at§ 2; Stavins, supranote 111, at52.
138. See, e.g., Gilbert E. Metcalf, A Proposal for a U.S. Carbon Tax Swap: An Equitable
Tax Reform to Address Global Climate Change (Hamilton Project, Discussion Paper No. 2007-
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We agree that regressive effects must be addressed but otherwise
would use revenues from the carbon tax to provide tax credits for
alternative energy development and more energy-efficient motor
vehicles, since the positive externalities that result from such re-
search and development means that funding is likely to be under-
supplied by the private sector even with a carbon tax in place.
Revenues could also be used to support carbon sequestration pro-
jects and other projects that reduce greenhouse gas emissions, like
mass transit and green building.39
Segregating the revenue from a carbon tax and using the pro-
ceeds to support further greenhouse gas reductions is justified be-
cause it reduces Benefit Uncertainty, which is the most serious
drawback of a carbon tax compared to cap and trade. In addition,
segregating the revenue is likely to reduce some political opposi-
tion to raising taxes in general, at least to the extent that such op-
position is based on the perception that government is wasteful. 4°
In theory, cap and trade can be used to generate the same
amount of revenue as a carbon tax, if all the allowances are auc-
tioned. In practice, however, all cap and trade proposals intro-
duced in Congress, as well as most academic proposals and existing
cap and trade programs in the United States and abroad, include
some free distribution of allowances.4 ' For example, the EU cap
and trade regime distributed ninety-five percent of the allowances
for free, and most Congressional proposals distribute over half of
the allowances for free. 4 ' The reason is obvious: for politicians, a
significant attraction of cap and trade is that it creates from noth-
12, 2007), available at http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/rc/papers/2007/
I Ocarbontaxmetcalf/ I 0_carbontaxmetcalf.pdf.
139. It could also be argued that the revenue from a carbon tax could be used to re-
duce other, less efficient taxes, thereby producing a "double dividend." See, e.g., Charles L.
Ballard, John H. Goddeeris, & Sang-Kyum Kim, Non-Homothetic Preferences and the Non-
Environmental Effects of Environmental Taxes, 12 INT'L TAX PUB. FIN. 115 (2005). However,
this double dividend theory has been disputed among economists. See, e.g., Juergen G.
Backhaus, The Law and Economics of Environmental Taxation: When Should the Ecotax Kick In ?,
19 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 117 (1999). Given the US budget deficit (current and projected),
we do not advocate reducing other taxes if a carbon tax is enacted.
140. See Robert W. Hahn, Greenhouse Gas Auctions and Taxes: Some Practical Considera-
tions (Am. Enter. Inst., Ctr. for Reg. & Mkt. Studies, Working Paper No. 08-12, 2008).
141. Flatt, supra note 134, at 141; Stavins, supra note 111.
142. Flatt, supra note 134, at 141.
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ing a new, scarce resource that they can use to reward their con-
stituents and donors. But if allowances are distributed for free, cap
and trade generates less revenue than a carbon tax, and this means
less potential to support research and development, carbon se-
questration, and other greenhouse-gas-reducing efforts.
Moreover, it seems unlikely that free allocation of allowances
would produce the optimal reduction in greenhouse gas emis-
sions. Some polluting industries are likely to get too many allow-
ances, and that would affect the trading price of allowances. At the
extreme, the result would be what occurred in Europe, where poli-
ticians created so many free allowances that no reduction from
business as usual was required at all, the price of allowances col-
lapsed, and the EU failed to meet its goals under the Kyoto Proto-
col.
A similar risk to free distribution of allowances under a carbon
tax would be pressure from affected industries for tax exemptions.
The process of enacting tax exemptions is more visible than the
process of distributing free allowances, however, and any exemp-
tion to one of the three industries affected (coal, natural gas, and
oil) would be met by resistance from the other two, hopefully re-
sulting in no exemptions at all.
3. Cost certainty.
A carbon tax ensures Cost Certainty: the cost is the amount of
the tax, and whatever the incidence of the tax (i.e., whether it can
be passed on to consumers or not), the cost cannot rise above the
tax rate. This enables businesses to plan ahead, secure in the
knowledge that raising the tax rate beyond any automatic adjust-
ment, which can be planned for, requires another vote in Congress
that they can hope to influence.
A cap and trade regime, on the other hand, suffers from inher-
ent Cost Uncertainty. While allowances may be initially distributed
for free, the key question for polluting businesses that need to ac-
quire allowances to address a reduction in the cap is what would be
the future price of allowances. Existing cap and trade programs
like the Southern California RECLAIM system for nitrogen oxide
emissions, in which the allowance prices spiked in 2000 to more
than twenty times their historical level, and the EU Emission Trad-
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ing Scheme (ETS), in which the price of allowances collapsed
when it became clear that too many allowances had been distrib-
uted, illustrate the problem of Cost Uncertainty in cap and trade
programs.'43 Cost Uncertainty makes it inherently difficult for
businesses to plan ahead.'" The fundamental problem is that the
reduction in the cap that is built into cap and trade would neces-
sarily make allowances more expensive. How much more expen-
sive depends on the development of future technologies, which
cannot be predicted with any accuracy over the longer time period
(fifty years or more) required for a cap and trade program to
achieve its environmental goals.
Cap and trade proponents argue that Cost Uncertainty can be
mitigated by provisions for banking extra allowances for use in fu-
ture years, and borrowing allowances from future years to use in
the present.45 These provisions add complexity, and it is unclear
whether they will be effective: in the early years of the program,
there are few allowances to bank, while borrowing risks leaving the
business with insufficient allowances in the future when the cap is
lower.
Ultimately, the only sure way of preventing Cost Uncertainty in
a cap and trade regime is to build in a "safety valve," which would
permit businesses to receive or purchase at a fixed price additional
allowances if the market price of allowances becomes too high.
Several of the current proposals in Congress have such built-in
safety valves.146 However, the problem with safety valves is that they
sacrifice Benefit Certainty, which is the main advantage of cap and
trade: by definition, providing extra allowances when the cap is
lowered means raising the cap.
Even if a cap and trade program has no safety valve built into it
from the start, the commitment to Benefit Certainty may be mis-
leading. If the lowered cap begins to seriously hurt businesses and
143. Stavins, supra note 110, at 314; cf Karl Ehrhart et al., The Role of Auctions and
Forward Markets in the EU ETS: Counterbalancing the Cost-Inefficiencies of Combining Generous
Allocation with a Ban on Banking, 5 CLIMATE POL'Y 31, 43 (2005) (recognizing that the EU
ETS distributed more allowances than it should have from a cost-efficiency standpoint).
144. See, e.g., supra note 74 and accompanying text (noting that the possibility of cer-
tainty was one reason that many European businesses welcomed regulation in this area).
145. Id.
146. Flatt, supra note 134.
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the price of allowances spikes, one should expect strong pressure
on politicians to stop lowering the cap. Benefit Certainty under
cap and trade as implemented may therefore be an illusion, while
Cost Uncertainty is very real.147
4. Signaling.
A carbon tax sends a clear signal to polluters: pollution im-
poses a negative externality on others, and you should be forced to
internalize that cost by paying the tax.' There is no ambiguity
about the message that is intended to be conveyed. Greenhouse
gas emissions are costly, and even if people are willing to pay the
price, they should be aware of the societal cost they are imposing.
A cap and trade system, however, sends a different and more
ambiguous message. On the one hand, its goal is to reduce green-
house gas emissions. On the other hand, it achieves that goal by ei-
ther allowing polluters to purchase theright to pollute (from the
government or from each other), or to receive permits to pollute
for free. The underlying message is that the government permits
you to pollute as long as you are willing to pay. Of course, the mes-
sage (and the cost imposed) may be the same, regardless of
whether a tax is -paid or whether an allowance is purchased, al-
though it is not the same if allowances are distributed for free. La-
bels are important, however, and calling the cost a tax sends a dif-
ferent signal than calling it the purchase price for a right to
pollute.'49
Admittedly, most of the activities that give rise to greenhouse
gases were until recently considered perfectly legitimate and even
positive. Driving a car or riding an airplane has no inherent moral
value, and operating an industrial plant creates jobs. But we now
know that these activities involve an additional collective cost, and
taxing them directly or indirectly forces us to acknowledge this
147. Kenneth C. Johnson, Beware of the Dogmatist: A Consensus Perspective on the Tax
versus Cap Debate (Soc. Sci. Research Network Working Paper, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1 154638.
148. Duff, supra note 119, at 2069 (citing ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. AND DEV.,
ENVIRONMENTALLY RELATED TAxEs IN OECD CouNTRiEs 21-31 (2001)).
149. For a response to the "right to pollute" critique, see generally Jonathan Remy
Nash, Framing Effects and Regulatoy Choice, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 313 (2006).
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cost in an unambiguous way. Permitting polluters to purchase the
right to pollute does not send the same signal.
C. Disadvantages of a Carbon Tax
1. Political resistance.
A primary reason that both presidential candidates supported
cap and trade during the 2008 election, and that other political
leaders and many academics support cap and trade, rather than a
carbon tax, reflects concern that a carbon tax cannot get enacted
because it is a tax. Politicians vividly remember the fate of the Clin-
ton-Gore BTU tax proposal in 1993, and "to be BTU'd" has be-
come the shorthand among Clinton Administration veterans for
what happens to supporters of politically unpopular proposals. 151
However, 2009 is not 1993. The public has shown overwhelm-
ing support in the United States for decisive action to curb green-
house gas emissions. When asked, Americans express just as much
willingness to support a carbon tax as a cap and trade regime
(which is more difficult to explain).1 1 If a new administration were
to propose a carbon tax in 2009, the political consequences might
be less than past experience suggests, especially if the revenue is
segregated and used to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, although
this clearly is the most significant practical challenge facing a car-
bon tax.
Moreover, opponents of cap and trade inevitably liken it to a
carbon tax. If allowances are auctioned, or even if they have to be
purchased from private parties, the resulting cost is likely to be
passed on to consumers. Thus, cap and trade is not just more
complicated, it is also subject to the same criticism as a carbon tax:
it will "increase gas prices at the pump"-an argument every voter
150. See, e.g., David E. Rosenbaum, Few See Gains from Social Security Tour, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 3, 2005.
151. See, e.g., Thomas E. Curry et al., A Survey of Public Attitudes Towards Climate Change
and Climate Change Mitigation Technologies in the United States: Analyses of 2006 Results (Mass.
Inst. of Tech. Lab. for Energy and the Env., Working Paper No. 2007-01, 2007), available at
http://sequestrationamit.edu/pdf/LFEE_2007_01_WP.pdf; see also Kene Boun My, Fran-
cois Cochard & Anthony Ziegelmayer, On the Acceptability of the Ambient Tax Mechanism: An
Experimental Investigation (Jena Econ. Research Papers, Working Paper No. 2007-081,
2007); Helmuth Cremer, Philippe de Donder & Firouz Gahvari, Political Sustainability and
the Design of Environmental Taxes, 11 INT'L TAX & PUB. FIN. 703 (2004).
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understands. If we are to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions, poli-
ticians will need to face down inevitable resistance whether they
propose a carbon tax or cap and trade.
Much of the opposition to a carbon tax is likely to come from
organized groups that stand to benefit from cap and trade.
5 2
These include industry groups that can easily reduce their emis-
sions and can therefore expect to derive income from selling ex-
cess allowances (which they envisage receiving for free), and Wall
Street, which can imagine the hefty fees it will charge for arranging
trades in allowances and futures trading to hedge against Cost Un-
certainty.' However, the carbon tax will also have its supporters,
primarily industry groups that will suffer from Cost Uncertainty
under cap and trade and would prefer the Cost Certainty provided
under the carbon tax.
15 4
2. Benefit uncertainty.
The main substantive disadvantage of a carbon tax compared
to cap and trade is Benefit Uncertainty. There can be no assurance
that any given tax level will result in the desired reduction in
greenhouse gas emissions. If the desired benefit is not achieved,
the tax may have to be raised, resulting in renewed political oppo-
sition, which could defeat the tax increase and thereby limit the
environmental benefits of the tax.
However, there are several reasons not to reject the carbon tax
because of Benefit Uncertainty. First, as pointed out above, cap
and trade may in fact be subject to similar Benefit Uncertainty, be-
cause if costs rise too high one can expect pressure to adjust the
cap, even if there is no built-in safety valve.
Second, the tax rate can in fact be adjusted. General experi-
ence with other taxes has shown that once a tax is in place, it is
usually not as hard to raise its rate despite political opposition to
152. Robert Hahn & Peter Passell, Time to Change US Climate Policy, 4.5 THE
ECONOMISTS' VOICE art. 2 (2007), www.bepress.com/ev/vol4/iss5/art2/.
153. See Leila Abboud, Carbon King: Economist Strikes Gold in Climate-Change Fight,
WALL ST.J., Mar. 13, 2008, at Al.
154. Martin A. Sullivan, Will Business Learn to Love the Carbon Tax?, TAX NOTES, May
26, 2008, available at http://www.taxanalysts.com/ww/features.nsf/Articles/
B1E993AF2B99722D8525745F007A58D3?OpenDocument.
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tax hikes; this is why people say that "an old tax is a good tax." The
United States income tax began in 1913 with a rate of one percent,
and has been raised (and lowered) many times since then (al-
though Americans have become increasingly unwilling to accept
tax increases). The Value Added Tax (VAT), which is now the
most important tax in the world, was typically introduced in over
100 countries at a much lower rate than the current one.15 If it be-
comes clear that the carbon tax rate needs to be raised to achieve
the necessary reduction in emissions, and if voters remain con-
vinced of the need to reduce emissions, historical experience sug-
gests that the rate could be raised, notwithstanding the political
challenges.
Finally, neither cap and trade (without a safety valve) nor a
carbon tax can truly achieve Benefit Certainty, because the desired
level of emissions (450 ppm) is based on worldwide emissions, not
United States emissions. We can have the strictest cap and trade
regime and suffer the full cost, but if China and India do nothing,
we will not have Benefit Certainty.
From this perspective, in addition to reducing greenhouse gas
emissions in the United States, both a carbon tax and a cap and
trade system serve the essential function of persuading the rest of
the world that we are serious, and therefore that they should co-
operate in a global policy to curb greenhouse gas emissions. Both
cap and trade and a carbon tax are equally useful from that per-
spective, but for the reasons explained above, a carbon tax can be
implemented much faster than cap and trade and, therefore, is
preferable from the standpoint of international leadership. Stated
differently, Benefit Certainty requires bringing large developing
countries to the bargaining table, and a carbon tax is better and
faster in doing so than cap and trade.
3. Tax exemptions.
Proponents of cap and trade argue that it is better than a car-
bon tax because the political bargain over which industries will get
relief from its cost has to be reached up front as part of the deci-
sion of how to allocate allowances. They also argue that a carbon
155. LIAM EBRILL ETAL., THE MODERN VAT 13-14 (2001).
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tax will be subject to pressure to enact permanent exemptions for
affected industries, which will permanently weaken its effect and
exacerbate its Benefit Uncertainty.
However, it is not clear that a carbon tax would necessarily be
weakened by any exemptions. This Article supports a proposal that
would apply the tax upstream to only three industries: coal, oil,
and natural gas producers and importers. None of these three in-
dustries is in a particularly good position to argue for exemptions
vis-A-vis the other two, and the ultimate incidence of the tax is too
unclear for other industries to effectively argue for exemptions.
The choice between free allocation of allowances under cap
and trade and exemptions under a carbon tax is similar to the fa-
miliar debate in the tax literature over whether direct subsidies or
tax expenditures are superior. Tax expenditures are indirect sub-
sidies delivered through tax reductions or exemptions. While the
traditional view has favored direct subsidies because they are ar-
guably more transparent and easier to administer, recently the
consensus has shifted to view both types of programs as equally
transparent, and so the choice between them comes down to ad-
ministrative considerations, which generally favor tax expenditures
that can be administered by the IRS.56
In the cap and trade versus carbon tax debate, the choice be-
tween free allowances and tax exemptions is simpler. Tax exemp-
tions are not necessary at all, but if they are enacted they will be
quite transparent and subject to criticism as giveaways to unpopu-
lar industries. They will also be relatively easy to administer by the
IRS. Free allowances, on the other hand, are inherently more
complicated to distribute and monitor, for the reasons given
above. This debate therefore favors the carbon tax.
4. Coordination.
Another alleged advantage of cap and trade and disadvantage
of the carbon tax is that it is easier to coordinate with the regimes
156. See Charles D. Patterson III, Environmental Taxes and Sitbsidies: What is the Appro-
priate Fiscal Policy for Dealing with Modern Environmental Problems', 24 WM. & MARY ENVrL. L.
& POL'Y REV. 121 (2000); David Weisbach &Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spend-
ingPrograms, 113YALE LJ. 955 (2004).
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implemented by other countries, and especially the EU ETS.'5
Proponents of cap and trade envisage direct transfers of allowances
between the United States cap and trade and the EU ETS, as well
as other potential cap and trade regimes in, for example, Can-
ada. 
58
Coordination issues may become more significant over time, if
cap and trade emerges as the dominant global approach to climate
change mitigation. However, this advantage is largely illusory at
present. The initial EU ETS has not been successful because too
many allowances were distributed, and it is unclear whether its re-
placement will be more successful.15 Canada is still debating be-
tween cap and trade and a carbon tax. As a result, there currently
is no global cap and trade regime for the United States to join.
Moreover, exchanging allowances with foreign cap and trade
regimes exponentially increases the enforcement difficulties in-
herent in cap and trade. Foreign allowances would have to be care-
fully monitored and verified to prevent widespread cheating. This
problem is exacerbated under the EU ETS because allowances are
distributed "downstream" to many different polluters. A carbon
tax, on the other hand, can easily be collected on imports and re-
bated on exports, and as long as it is also imposed on domestic
production, it does not pose significant World Trade Organization
compliance issues."
If, as a result of enacting a United States carbon tax, the United
States is able to participate in negotiating a worldwide accord on
curbing greenhouse gases, and if that accord is built on a global
cap and trade regime, then we can consider adopting a United
157. See generally Clare Langley-Hawthorne, An International Market for Transferable Gas
Emission Permits to Promote Climate Change, 9 FORDHAM ENVrL. L.J. 261 (1998).
158. Stavins, supra note 111, at 358.
159. See generally Inho Choi, Global Climate Change and the Use of Economic Approaches:
The Ideal Design Features of Domestic Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading with an Analysis of the
European Union's CO2 Emissions Trading Directive and the Climate Stewardship Act, 45 NAT.
REsOURCES.J. 865 (2005).
160. Cinnamon Carlarne, The Kyoto Protocol and the WTO: Reconciling Tensions Between
Free Trade and Environmental Objectives, 17 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 45 (2006); An-
drew Green & Tracey Epps, The W7O, Science and the Environment: Moving Toward Consis-
tency, 10J. INT'L ECON. L. 285 (2007); Robert Howse & Antonia Eliason, DOMESTIC AND
INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIES TO ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE: AN OVERVIEW OF THE Wo
LEGAL ISSUES (forthcoming) (on file with authors).
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States cap and trade system to match with that regime. In the ab-
sence of such a regime, it would be unwise to enact cap and trade
just because the EU has adopted a flawed cap and trade system.
IV. CONCLUSION
The global climate change crisis will not be resolved simply by
implementing a carbon tax or a cap and trade system-or by any
other legislative approach. Fundamental changes in energy pro-
duction, development, and conservation, as well as changes in
transportation, land use, and natural resource policies, must be
pursued alongside efforts to reduce carbon dioxide emissions.
An effective carbon mitigation strategy, however, will be the
centerpiece of any successful program to combat global climate
change. While the widespread embrace of cap and trade is a posi-
tive development after decades of inaction, before we move for-
ward we should pause to consider whether a cap and trade system
is the best approach to combating global climate change. This Ar-
ticle demonstrates that a better response to global climate change
would be a carbon tax that is adjusted over time to achieve the
necessary reductions in carbon dioxide emissions, as well as the
corresponding improvements in alternative energy sources and
land and resource management practices that are essential to con-
serving our planet for future generations.
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